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CROSS-BURNING Is NOT A THREAT:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR HATE SPEECH
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
C. Catherine Scallan
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court handed down R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,' on June 22, 1992,
and it was immediately seized upon in the press as a statement by the Court that
cross-burning was an acceptable mode of political expression.2 While this may
have been the popular impression -after all, the high Court had also been popu-
larly reported to give its imprimatur to flag burning3 - the Justices all carefully de-
nied that any such interpretation was the case.4 The Court did hold that a St. Paul,
Minnesota anti-hate speech ordinance violated the petitioner's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech. I The majority opinion crafted a rule against "content-
based" governmental discrimination, while four Justices, in three separate
1. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
2. See, e.g., Court Excerpts: Adding Free Speech "to the Fire,"WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at A-6; Glen
Elsasser, High Court Voids Ban on Hate Signs, Cm. TRiB., June 23, 1992, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, High Court
Voids Law Singling Out Crimes of Hatred, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at A-i; Linda Greenhouse, The Court's 2
Visions of Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A-13; Greg Henderson, Justices Say "Hate Crime" Laws
Violate Free Speech, UPI, June 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Dick Lehr, High Court
Overturns "Hate Crime" Ordinance, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23, 1992, at 1; Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns
Law Barring Hate Crimes. Free Speech Ruling Seen as Far-Reaching, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at A-1."
3. These allegations were made following the decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). See infra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Back Protesters'Right to Burn
the Flag, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1989, at A- 1; Al Kamen, Court Nullifies Flag-Desecration Laws; FirstAmendment
Is Held to Protect Burnings During Political Demonstrations, WASH. POST, June 22, 1989, at A- 1; Judith Martin, A
Banner Day for Etiquette, WASH. POST, July 16, 1989, at F-1 ("In judging how best to protect the sanctity of the
American flag, the U.S. Supreme Court has awarded custody to etiquette. Miss Manners concurs.").
4. In the majority opinion, there is the following statement: "Let there be no mistake about our belief that
burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to pre-
vent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire." R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2550. Justice White,
in his concurrence, called this type of expression "repugnant." Id. at 2559 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun spoke out more strongly:
I see no First Amendment values that are compromised by a law that prohibits hoodlums from driving
minorities out of their homes by burning crosses on their lawns, but I see great harm in preventing the
people of Saint Paul from specifically punishing the race-based fighting words that so prejudice their
community.
Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Finally, Justice Stevens stated, "The cross-burning in this case-
directed as it was to a single African-American family trapped in their home- was nothing more than a crude
form of physical intimidation. That this cross-burning sends a message of racial hostility does not automatically
endow it with complete constitutional protection." Id. at 2569 (Stevens, J., concurring).
5. Id. at 2542.
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concurrences, would have invalidated the ordinance based on the more technical
First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth.6
This Note will discuss the facts and procedural history of the present case; the
probable and presumed legislative intent of the ordinance; the more recent history
of United States case law in the area of the First Amendment, especially with re-
gard to fighting words, obscenity, and defamation -all proscribable categories of
speech; and the differing views of the Justices in the instant case. Finally, this Note
will examine the legal viability, as well as the future social utility and efficacy, of
anti-hate speech laws.
II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE INSTANT CASE
Before dawn on the morning of June 21, 1990, a minor, identified by the Court
as "R.A.V. ,"' along with a group of cohorts, set fire to a cross he had fashioned
from wooden chair legs outside the home of the only African-American family in
his neighborhood.8 R.A.V. was subsequently prosecuted under the St. Paul,
Minnesota, Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. 9
The City Council of St. Paul, Minnesota, undoubtedly passed its Bias-Moti-
vated Crime Ordinance with the best of intentions and hopes that such a law would
have a positive effect by easing racial tensions and ameliorating improperly-based
biases in the community. As an initial point in understanding the legislative history
of the ordinance, it may be analyzed according to the "fighting words" doctrine
carved out by the Supreme Court beginning with Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"
and later widely recognized as an "exception" to the usual protections of the First
Amendment.1" In fact, the 1990 St. Paul ordinance at issue in the instant case is
substantially similar to a Minnesota "fighting words" statute litigated in an earlier
6. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-27 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
TRIBE]. "[O]verbreadth analysis ordinarily compares the statutory line defining burdened and unburdened con-
duct with the judicial line specifying activities protected and unprotected by the first amendment; if the statutory
line includes conduct which the judicial line protects, the statute is overbroad and becomes eligible for invalida-
tion on that ground." Id. at 1022.
7. The petitioner has since reached the age of majority and disclosed his identity to the press. His name is
Robert A. Viktora, and he is a member of a neo-Nazi-type organization in the St. Paul area. See, e.g., Nick
Coleman, The Court Sends a Message. Hate Crimes: Will Ruling Spur Bigotry?, ATLANTA CONST., June 25, 1992,
at A-15.
8. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
9. Id. (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)). That statute states:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graf-
fiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292,02 (1990).
10. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 417 (Minn. 1978) ("Ever since Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which the Supreme Court examined a First Amendment challenge to a New
Hampshire statute ... such offensive speech statutes have been found to be constitutional only if criminal prose-
cution is permitted solely for 'fighting words.' "(citations omitted)); see also R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White,
J., dissenting) ("Today, however, the Court announces that earlier Courts did not mean their repeated statements
that certain categories of expression are 'not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.' " (emphasis
added) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)); see generally Frederick Schauer, Categories
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 vAND. L. REv. 265 (1981).
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case, 12 except that the more recent law has an added feature of criminalizing bias-
based speech.13
In the case of In re Welfare of R.A. V,1" the petitioner's primary argument was
that the St. Paul ordinance15 was substantially overbroad.1 I The doctrine of over-
breadth will be discussed later at some length;17 for now it suffices to say that the
Minnesota trial court granted the petitioner's motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the anti-hate speech ordinance was overly broad in violation of the First
Amendment.' 8 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not find the ordinance
to be overly broad because it was possible for the court to narrow the construction
of the statute to reach only fighting words. 19 The Minnesota Supreme Court there-
fore reversed the dismissal at the trial court level and sought to remand the case for
a determination of whether R.A.V.'s actions constituted proscribable conduct
within the newly-narrowed meaning of the ordinance,2" but the United States
12. S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 412.
13. In the case of In re Welfare ofS.L.J., the Minnesota case construing the forerunner to the present statute, a
14-year old girl was prosecuted under a law criminalizing fighting words after she proclaimed to police officers,
"Fuck you pigs."ld. at 415. An interesting comment on the development of the English language and the change-
able nature of what are found to be "fighting words" becomes apparent when one compares "damned racketeer"
and "damned Fascist," the fighting words of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942), with the
strong words at issue in the Minnesota case, which were found not to constitute fighting words. S.L.J., 263
N.W.2d at 415.
The Minnesota statute at issue in S.L.J. reads as follows:
Whoever does any of the following in a public or private place, knowing, or having reasonable grounds
to know that it will, or will tend to, alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or breach of the
peace, is guilty of disorderly conduct, which is a misdemeanor:
(1) Engages in brawling or fighting; or
(2) Disturbs an assembly or meeting, not unlawful in its character; or
(3) Engages in offensive, obscene, or abusive language or in boisterous and noisy conduct tending
reasonably to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.72(1) (West 1987). The Minnesota Supreme Court held the statute constitutional, say-
ing that it reached only fighting words, which were not protected under the First Amendment. S.L.J., 263
N.W.2d at 418-19. That court, in an interesting tactic which it repeated in In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d
507 (Minn.), cert. granted sub norn. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Ill S. Ct. 2795 (1991), and rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2538 (1992), said that the statute was facially unconstitutional, but it could be salvaged by a narrow construction
limiting it to fighting words. S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 418-19. Later, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992), the United States Supreme Court would hold that it was bound by the state court's narrow construction,
and that it must construe the statute exactly as the state high court had done. Id. at 2542. The Court therefore
held, "[W]e accept the Minnesota Supreme Court's authoritative statement that the ordinance reaches only those
expressions that constitute 'fighting words' within the meaning of Chaplinsky." Id.
In S.L.J., the fighting words statute was held to be constitutional, but the girl's profane declaration was not
found to be within the ambit of the statute because, the court reasoned, they were spoken to two police officers by
a 14-year old "child," from a distance of 15 feet away, and were thereby not likely "to incite an immediate breach
of the peace or to provoke violent reaction by an ordinary, reasonable person." S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d at 419-20. It
is important to remember, however, that when the constitutionality of a statute that limits freedom of speech is at
issue, "the specific conduct responsible for the conviction being challenged is irrelevant." Id. at 418 (citing Good-
ing v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,520 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974)).
14.464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.), cert. granted sub nom. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991), and
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
15. See supra note 9.
16. R.A. V, 464 N.W.2d at 508-09.
17. See infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 13.
19. See supra note 13.
20. R.A.V, 464 N.W.2d at 511.
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Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Supreme Court before
any further action was taken.21
The high Court ruled in agreement with the Minnesota trial court and struck
down the ordinance as unconstitutional, not, said the majority, because of over-
breadth, but because the ordinance "prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely
on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."22 The three concurrences, rep-
resenting the opinions of four Justices, would have stricken the ordinance based
on overbreadth.23 The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court was reversed and
remanded for action consistent with the ruling of the Court.24
III. HIsToRY OF THE LAW
A. Fighting Words
The seminal fighting words case is Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2" in which the
Supreme Court held the following:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the in-
sulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace .26
The definition of "fighting words" stated above is still the central statement of this
exception to First Amendment protection of speech, and statutes which would pro-
scribe "fighting words" must come narrowly within this definition in order to be
constitutional .27 Chaplinsky also presented the still-vital idea that the social utility
of free speech should be weighed against the state's interest in suppressing certain
speech acts, saying that some "utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order andmo-
rality.
28
In Chaplinsky, the appellant's conviction under the New Hampshire fighting
words statute was affirmed, as the Supreme Court found, "Argument is unneces-
sary to demonstrate that the appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist'
are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a
21. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, I IIS. Ct. 2795 (1991) (mem.).
22. R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
23. See id. at 2550 (White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., O'Connor, J., and Stevens, J., except for Part I(A),
concurring in the judgment only); id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[T]his particular or-
dinance reaches beyond fighting words to speech protected by the First Amendment."); id. (Stevens, J., joined by
White, J., and Blackmun, J., as to Part I, concurring in the judgment).
24. Id. at 2550.
25. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
26. Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
27. According to the concurring justices in the instant case, the ordinance at issue in R.A. V went beyond this
definition and was therefore unconstitutional. See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
28. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. For a recent expression of this idea, see Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d
935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991). See also TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-8 at 836-38.
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breach of the peace. 2 9 The test, therefore, is what would cause the "average per-
son" to be incited to violence. The Court hinted cryptically that there are" 'classi-
cal fighting words,' "but other types of speech would be proscribable on this basis
as well, including "profanity, obscenity and threats.""
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,1 the Supreme Court again heard the issue of
fighting words. In this case, an ordinance declaring as unlawful " 'wantonly to
curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference
to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty' "32
was held to be overly broad and therefore unconstitutional." The Louisiana
Supreme Court had held that the statute was limited to fighting words within the
meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,34 but the United States Supreme Court
found that since "opprobrious" language was not narrowly defined, the plain
meaning of the ordinance encompassed protected speech, and thereby violated the
overbreadth doctrine."
The common tactic, then, of fighting words analysis is to say that words which
fit narrowly within the definition set out in Chaplinsky are not protected by the
First Amendment.3 This facile categorization has been used by courts to rational-
ize the denial of First Amendment protection for speech acts which are dangerous,
which might provoke violence, and which are devoid of any other social value
which would militate their protection under the Constitution. 7 Seemingly, the
drawing of such categories to facilitate First Amendment analysis would be a use-
ful tool, appreciated by courts and legislators alike; however, this paper will at-
tempt to show that such categorization leads to improper results and the misguided
valuing of speech which has no real social worth.
B. Other "Content-Based" Government Regulations of Speech
A sampling of other cases and fact situations in which the Court has dealt with
governments seeking to restrict free speech will show the breadth and variety of
"content-based" restrictions on speech. Cantwell v. Connecticut38 is an early case
involving a statute requiring religious or philanthropic organizations to register
with the Secretary of State before their members are allowed to solicit contribu-
tions.3 9 Under the facts of the case, two Jehovah's Witnesses set out distributing
29. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574. See supra note 13.
30. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H.), prob. juris. noted,
62 S. Ct. 89 (1941), and aff'd, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
31. 415 U.S. 130(1974).
32. Id. at 132 (quoting NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7 [sic]).
33. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 131-32.
34. City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450,456 (La. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 412 U.S. 926 (1973),
and rev d, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
35. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132-33. See infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
36. TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-10 at 850.
37. These standards follow Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See supra note 28 and ac-
companying text.
38. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
39. Id. at 300-02 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6294 (1930)).
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information and collecting contributions in a predominantly Catholic neighbor-
hood.4" Some of their informational materials contained anti-Catholic senti-
ments.41 When confronted over these materials, the appellant Jehovah's Witness
peacefully left the scene; nevertheless, he was arrested and charged with violation
of the registration statute and with breach of the peace.42
The State argued that the law requiring registration was for the purpose of safe-
guarding its citizens from the fraudulent acts of persons who would pretend to be
soliciting for legitimate religious groups.' It was with this idea of "legitimacy"
that the Court took exception, for the Secretary of State would have to make a de-
termination of which religious groups were legitimate and which were illegiti-
mate." The Court would allow the State some room to regulate the solicitation of
contributions, but the idea of the State granting a license to a religious cause was
held to be too much of a burden on the free exercise of religion.4" Analogously, the
State can regulate freedom of expression, as long as there is no indication that offi-
cial sanctioning of certain ideas or viewpoints is intended.'
The Court also held that the petitioner's conviction for breach of the peace must
be set aside, as the petitioner had done nothing that might incite others to riot or to
"exhort others to physical attack."47 Even though the Court conceded that the
Catholics in the neighborhood were "highly offended" by the petitioner's propa-
ganda, his speech was held to be constitutionally protected because there was no
breach of the peace, and the petitioner's actions and statements were not "likely to
provoke violence."' The Court did point out, however, that if there had been
"[riesort to epithets or personal abuse," the speech would not have been protected
by the Constitution, as that sort of speech "is not in any proper sense communica-
tion of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punish-
ment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."4 9
In United States v. O'Brien,50 the Court held that the government did have a suf-
ficiently substantial interest in the Selective Service System to suppress the de-
fendant's free speech interest in burning his draft card." The Court first addressed
O'Brien's contention that his act of burning the draft card constituted "speech." 2
Chief Justice Warren made clear that the Court would not accept "an apparently
40.Id. at 301-03.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 302-03.
43. Id. at 304-05.
44. Id. at 305.
45. Id. at 306-07.
46. See R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992).
47. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940).
48. Id. at 309.
49. Id. at 309-10. This case is pre-Chaplinsky, but one may assume that these hypothetical speech acts would
have been analyzed in a manner similar to Chaplinsky fighting words standards. See supra notes 25-30 and ac-
companying text.
50. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
51. Id. at 382.
52. Id. at 376.
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limitless variety of conduct [to] be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea."53 However, the Court held that
"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of con-
duct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. 5 4
Therefore, there must be a substantial government interest at stake in order to limit
the free expression of ideas, even when the act may not be easily described as
"speech."
In 1969, the Supreme Court heard Brandenburg v. Ohio,"5 in which the appel-
lant had been charged with violation of Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act 6 for his
actions at a Ku Klux Klan rally, including burning a cross, making racially deroga-
tory statements, and allegedly advocating violence to bring about social change. 7
The Criminal Syndicalism Act would levy criminal penalties for "mere advocacy"
of violence, as opposed to "incitement to imminent lawless action." 8 The Supreme
Court held that the former was protected by the free speech guarantees of the First
Amendment, while the latter was not protected and could properly be proscribed
by the State.59
The distinction between "advocacy" and "incitement" surely lies outside of the
simple content of the disputed speech, and somewhere the context of the words
must be considered. Justice Douglas, in his concurrence in this case,6" approached
this idea of context when he quoted Justice Holmes' dissent in Gitlow v. New York:61
'Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is
acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the ex-
pression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the
speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason.'62
Thus, the "danger" or, alternatively, the value, of a certain type of speech is evalu-
ated not simply based on what was said, but on the context surrounding the
speech. In the context of a Ku Klux Klan rally, it may readily be seen that certain
types of speech would "set fire to reason" and incite violence. What would be
"mere advocacy" in one setting might easily transcend that in another.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (Baldwin 1970) (repealed 1974).
57. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445-46.
58. Id. at 448-49.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 450-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
61. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
62. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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Police Department v. Mosley63 concerned a Chicago ordinance which prohibited
any picketing within 150 feet of a school, but which specifically excluded
" 'peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.' "" Mr. Earl Mos-
ley brought his case soon after the city of Chicago passed the ordinance.6 Prior to
the passage of the ordinance, for a period of about seven months, he had been in-
volved in frequent picketing of a Chicago high school, carrying a sign which read
" 'Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black
quota.' "66 The Court described his "lonely crusade [as] always peaceful, orderly,
and quiet."67 Given the facts of the case, it became difficult for the city to argue
why it should disallow other types of peaceful pickets, while permitting labor
picketing.68
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance "because it makes an impermis-
sible distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing."69 This was
held to be an unconstitutional, content-based discrimination: "The operative dis-
tinction is the message on a picket sign."7" The focus of the Court's opinion was on
the impermissibility of such content-based discrimination -the idea that "govern-
ment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable,
but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.
And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facil-
ities."71
In 1989, the Court struck down a Texas flag desecration statute72 in Texas v.
Johnson. Justice Brennan reiterated the idea that governments cannot regulate
freedom of expression merely because of disagreement with the ideas expressed,
stating, "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."74 Further, the Court again ad-
dressed the issue of actions which will sometimes fall under the protection of the
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, holding that flag burning car-
ried enough of a communicative element to be brought under the protections of the
First Amendment.7"
63. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
64. Id. at 92-93 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE C. 193-1(i) (1968)).
65. Id. at 93-94.
66. Id. at 93.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 94-95.
69. Id. at 94.
70. Id. at 95.
71. Id. at96.
72. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(a)(3) (West 1989) (repealed 1989).
73. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
74. Id. at 414.
75. Id. at 409.
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Finally in 1992, the Court heard the case of Burson v. Freeman76 which con-
cerned content-based regulation of political speech.7 7 A Tennessee statute prohib-
iting political speech near polling places and creating an "election-day
'campaign-free zone' "78 was upheld as a constitutional exercise of the State's regu-
lation of speech. The Court stressed the idea that such content-based restrictions
of speech must pass a test of "exacting scrutiny," and "[t]he State must show that
the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end.' "80 The State of Tennessee was held to have "two
compelling interests" which were protected by this statute: "First, . . . the right of
its citizens to vote freely for the candidates of their choice. Second, . . . the right
to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability.""1 In regard to the
strict scrutiny standard, the Court "reaffirm[ed] that it is the rare case in which we
have held that a law survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case. "82
C. Related Categories of Defamation and Obscenity
In R.A. V v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court held a city ordinance unconsti-
tutional because it was impermissibly content-based .8 In cases of both defama-
tion and obscenity, governments seek to regulate freedom of expression because
there is something objectionable about the content of that expression. One major
case in each of these related areas will serve to draw the bounds of permissible
government suppression of speech.
The case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' is a quite famous case for historical
reasons. It was heard by the Supreme Court in 1964 and was brought by the
Commissioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, against the New York
Times Company in response to an advertisement taken in The New York Times by
supporters of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.8" The advertisement was an effort to
raise money for his defense, as Dr. King was then being prosecuted for what many
believed to be baseless perjury charges.86 The full-page advertisement described
events which had been taking place in the South and the "wave of terror" with
which those working for civil rights had been met.87 The respondent Sullivan
claimed, although he was not actually named in the advertisement, readers would
76. 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992).
77. Id. at 1847.
78. Id. at 1848 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111 (b) (Supp. 1991)).
79. Id. at 1857.
80. Id. at 1851 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
81. Id. (footnotes omitted).
82. Id. at 1857.
83. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85. Id. at 256.
86. Id. at 256-57. Dr. King was later acquitted of the charge of perjury. Id. at 259.
87. Id. at 256-57.
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infer that the actions of the "police" described in the advertisement were his
actions.88
Sullivan brought suit, and the trial court instructed the jury that the statements
in the advertisement were" 'libelous per se,' . . . so that . . . 'falsity and malice
are presumed' [and] 'general damages need not be . . . proved but are pre-
sumed.' "89 Sullivan later argued to the United States Supreme Court that the peti-
tioners' rights to free speech were not violated because "the Constitution does not
protect libelous publications."9" The Supreme Court recognized that libel is not
considered to be constitutionally protected speech, but neither can a state use its
"libel laws to impose sanctions upon expression critical of the official conduct of
public officials."91
In order to avoid a rule of law that "dampens the vigor and limits the variety of
public debate,"92 the Supreme Court held that in order for speech in criticism of a
public official to lose its constitutional protection, there must be actual malice,
that is knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth, on the part of the
speaker.9 "[N]either factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the
constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct . . . ." Consequently, a
heightened level of constitutional protection for speech critical of public officials
was reached.
The respondents in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. were owners of
two movie theaters in which they sought to exhibit feature-length pornographic
films.96 The City Council of Renton, Washington, had adopted a resolution which
"imposed a moratorium on the licensing of 'any business. . . which. . has as its
primary purpose the selling, renting or showing of sexually explicit materials.' ""
Furthermore, a city zoning ordinance prohibited the location of adult movie the-
aters within 1000 feet of any residence, church, or park, and within one mile of
any school .
The Court, in its decision, addressed the following problem:
At first glance, the Renton ordinance,. . . does not appear to fit neatly into either
the "content-based" or the "content-neutral" category. To be sure, the ordinance
treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.
Nevertheless,. . . the Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films...
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community. 99
88. Id. at 258.
89. Id. at 262.
90. Id. at 268.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 279.
93. Id. at 279-80.
94. Id. at 273.
95. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
96.Id. at45.
97. Id. at 44 (quoting City of Renton, Wash., City Council Res. No. 2368 (1980)).




By this reasoning, the Court does not even need to make the factual finding of
whether or not the materials the respondents sought to exhibit in their theater were
obscene and therefore proscribable; it may merely hold that the ordinance is
content-neutral and aimed only at the secondary effects of the speech. In essence,
the Court held that the ordinance was not even about speech, but rather was only a
means to curtail crime, for example.
The respondents were unsuccessful with their argument that the ordinance was
"'under-inclusive,' in that it fail [ed] to regulate other kinds of adult businesses that
[were] likely to produce secondary effects similar to those produced by adult the-
aters.""' The "secondary effects" that supposedly prompted the city's ordinance
included increased crime, decline in property values, deterioration of neighbor-
hoods, and general diminishing of the quality of life.1"1 The Court held that the
Renton ordinance was justified on a content-neutral basis as a proper exercise of
governmental control over speech in an attempt to pursue proper governmental
ends."2 Regulations which are found to be content-neutral are not rigorously re-
versed for over- or under-inclusiveness, so no violation of the respondents' First
Amendment rights was found.103
D. The Doctrine of Overbreadth
The doctrine of overbreadth is often described as a technical exception to the
standing requirement,"0 as in Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc. ,10 where the
Court held that "an individual whose own speech or expressive conduct may val-
idly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face be-
cause it also threatens others not before the court." 06 Therefore, even though the
actions of a particular individual may properly be sanctioned under the law, that
individual may challenge the statute, contending that the statutory language is so
100. Id. at 52.
101. Id. at 48.
102. Id. at 54-55.
103. Id. at 47, 54-55.
104. Generally, the doctrine of standing acts as an initial hurdle constitutional cases must overcome before they
may properly be reviewed by a court. The Supreme Court clarified the requirements of this doctrine in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, held that "at an irreducible minimum," the Constitution requires a liti-
gant to" 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant,' and that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action' and 'is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision.' "Id. at 472 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976) (citations omitted)). Standing
requirements will not be met where a litigant " 'rest[s] his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third
parties' "or presents" 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,'
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches." Id. at 474-75 (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (citations omitted)). Lastly, a litigant's complaint must come
within a" 'zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' "
Id. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (citations
omitted)).
105. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
106. Id. at 503.
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broadly drawn as to prohibit other, perfectly legal, actions which may in the future
be committed by others.107
An Oklahoma statute limiting the right of state employees to engage in political
activities" 8 was held by the Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma"9 to be sufficiently
narrow and explicit so as not to fail for overbreadth.11 ' The law proscribed a
"broad range of political activities,""'1 but because the law was quite clear as to
what types of activities were prohibited,112 it was held to be constitutional.113 The
Court expressed the limited usefulness of the overbreadth doctrine as follows:
The consequence of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the First
Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it
as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expres-
sion. Application of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong
medicine. 
114
In Board ofAirport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. ,1 the Court held that a
resolution of the Los Angeles Airport Commission which banned all " 'First
Amendment activities by any individual and/or entity' "from the airport was sub-
stantially overbroad. 116 Following passage of the resolution, a member of the reli-
gious group Jews for Jesus was stopped while distributing leaflets at the airport
terminal. '17 The Court once again balanced the government's interest in restricting
speech with the individual's right to freedom of expression,118 in light of the rule
that governments may restrict activities on certain government property (i.e., in
certain types of fora) if the restriction is" 'reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because officials oppose the speaker's view.' "119 The Court
concluded that the resolution was substantially overbroad because, "the resolution
at issue in this case reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibiting
107. See TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-27; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 858 (1991) ("The basic overbreadth problem is easily framed: When should someone whose conduct is not
constitutionally protected escape a legal sanction on the ground that the statute under which she is threatened
would be consitutionally invalid as applied to someone else?"); Christopher P. Lu, The Role of State Courts in
Narrowing Overbroad Speech Laws After Osborne v. Ohio, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 254 (1991) ("[Olver-
breadth doctrine is a traditional exception to the notion that 'individuals may not litigate the rights of third par-
ties.' "(quoting TRIBE, supra note 6, § 12-27 (2d ed. 1988) (further citations omitted))).
108. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 818 (1965) (repealed 1982).
109. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
110. Id. at 615-16, 618.
111.Id. at 604.
112.Id. at 607-08.
113. Id. at 618.
114. Id. at 613.
115. 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
116. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Board of Airport Comm'rs Res. No. 13787 (1983)).
117. Id. at 571.
118. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
119. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 572-73 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 (1983)).
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all protected expression, purports to create a virtual 'First Amendment Free Zone'
at [the Los Angeles International Airport]."12
The Court further noted that it could see no way to construe this resolution nar-
rowly, and thereby save it from a finding of overbreadth.' 2' Indeed, this ban on
"First Amendment activities" might be held to reach "even talking or reading, or
the wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing." '22 Had the Airport
Commission merely regulated against activities which might cause disruption or
block the orderly flow of travelers through the airport, then such a regulation
might have been upheld by the Court, but as it was written, it was held to be fa-
cially unconstitutional. 
12 3
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
A. Rules of Construction and Decision
Three preliminary issues should be discussed before the main holdings of the
case are analyzed. These issues include limiting the construction of the statute to
the interpretation of the state high court, limiting the decision of the United States
Supreme Court to the issues which had been briefed by the parties, and keeping the
holding of the Court within the bounds of precedent in this area. Discussion of
these relatively minor issues will be presented first because the concurring opin-
ions all diminish the majority's analytical strength by pointing out flaws in the ap-
plication of these well-established rules of construction and decision.
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion with the rule that the Court would
construe the St. Paul ordinance as the state supreme court had done. 124 Conse-
quently, the majority of the Court did not find the ordinance to be fatally over-
broad, since the state court had narrowed its interpretation to reach only fighting
words.125 Rather, the Supreme Court reached a new rule against content-based
discrimination, holding the ordinance unconstitutional because "it prohibits other-
wise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses." 26
Although the state supreme court had effectively held that the ordinance was
content-neutral, as it reached only fighting words, Justice Scalia found it to be im-
permissibly content-based, restricting speech because of the message expressed
by the speaker. 
127
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the majority as to the rule
that the Supreme Court was bound by the state high court's interpretation. 128 How-
ever, "the mere presence of a state court interpretation does not insulate a statute
120. Id. at 574.
121. d. at 575.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 574-77.
124. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992). See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
125. R.A.V, 112 SCt. at 2542.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2558-59 (White, J., concurring).
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from overbreadth review. We have stricken legislation when the construction sup-
plied by the state court failed to cure the overbreadth problem."129 Accordingly,
Justice White would have stricken the statute for overbreadth in spite of the limit-
ing interpretation of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
1 30
Justice White was further disturbed by the idea that the theory of unconstitu-
tionality advanced by the majority was not "fairly included" in the arguments pre-
sented to the Court.13 1 White wrote, "Previously, this Court has shown the
restraint to refrain from deciding cases on the basis of its own theories when they
have not been pressed or passed upon by a state court of last resort." 132 Justice
Scalia responded to this charge in the main opinion by arguing, "It was clear from
the petition . . . that [petitioner's] assertion . . . was not just a technical 'over-
breadth' claim - i.e., a claim that the ordinance violated the rights of too many
third parties - but included the contention that the ordinance was 'overbroad' in the
sense of restricting more speech than the Constitution permits."133
Another concern Justice White expressed in his concurrence was that the new
rule stated by the Court encompassed "serious departures from the teaching of
prior cases" as well as being "inconsistent with the plurality opinion in Burson v.
Freeman."'34 There the Court upheld a Tennessee statute, finding that the State of
Tennessee had enough of a compelling interest to place restrictions on freedom of
speech in order to create an "election-day 'campaign-free zone.' "13 Justice White
felt that this break from precedent was even more fraught with potential problems
for the Court because the issues which the majority addressed in its opinion had
not been properly briefed by the parties to aid the Court in its decision, so that the
Court would have a careful examination of the precedent prepared by each side of
the case. 136 Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, echoed Justice White's
concerns, but stated the problem in a more impassioned tone:
The majority opinion signals one of two possibilities: it will serve as precedent for
future cases, or it will not....
In the second instance is the possibility that this case will not significantly alter
First Amendment jurisprudence, but, instead, will be regarded as an aberration-a
case where the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down an ordinance whose prem-
ise it opposed, namely, that racial threats and verbal assaults are of greater harm
than other fighting words.
137
129. Id. at 2559 (citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-33 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518,524-25 (1972)).
130. Id. at 2558-59.
131. Id. at 2550-51 n.1.
132. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217-24 (1983)).
133. Id. at 2542 n.3.
134. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring) (citing Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992)).
135. Burson, 112 S. Ct. at 1846, 1848, 1857-58 (1992) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-111 (b) (Supp. 1991)).
See supm notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
136. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2551 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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B. Distinctions Between Content and Context
The majority's insistence on a shift in the semantics, if not the underlying anal-
ysis of free-speech cases, appears to have greatly distressed the writers of the con-
curring opinions. This "shift" is the rejection of the traditional "categories" of
speech which are often said to be outside of the protection of the First
Amendment. 8 Justice Scalia nullified this categorical method of analysis, which
had become pervasive in First Amendment thought:
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection of the First
Amendment does not extend" to them. Such statements must be taken in context,
however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand
characterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all." What they mean is that these
areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of
their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) -not that
they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may
be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively pro-
scribable content.1
3 9
The other members of the Court, concurring in the judgment only, found the
categorical approach to First Amendment analysis to be quite useful, and feared
that the majority's rejection of this long-employed methodology would result in
confusion among the lower courts.140 Justice Stevens, however, was also critical of
the categorical approach, but for the reason that "the categorical approach does not
take seriously the importance of context." 4' That is, the approach is insufficiently
sensitive to the tension between free speech and other interests to be protected in a
given case.
Justice Stevens' emphasis on context is much more esoteric than the hard-and-
fast rule Justice Scalia stated in the main opinion: "Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid."' 42 Justice Stevens took him to task for this
138. See supra note II and accompanying text.
139. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2543 (citations omitted) (quoting Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 124 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,504 (1984); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (defamation); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (fighting words); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 615 n. 146 (1986)).
140. See, e.g., Justice White's statement condemning the majority opinion: "Its decision is an arid, doctrinaire
interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of judges to tinker with the First Amendment. The
decision is mischievous at best and will surely confuse the lower courts. Ijoin the judgment, but not the folly of
the opinion." R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2560 (White, J., concurring). See also Justice Stevens' concurrence referring
to "the Court's revision of the categorical approach" as "an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland," id. at 2562
(Stevens, J., concurring), and Justice Blackmun's prediction that "[i]f we are forbidden from categorizing, as the
Court has done here, we shall reduce protection [of speech] across the board." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
141. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens did admit that categories have some analytical utility
because they create "safe harbors for governments and speakers alike." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2542.
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pronouncement, reasoning that such an absolutism would lead the Court to irratio-
nal holdings in future cases. "'
Although the Court has, on occasion, declared that content-based regulations of
speech are "never permitted," such claims are overstated. Indeed, in Mosley itself,
the Court indicated that Chicago's selective proscription of nonlabor picketing was
not per se unconstitutional, but rather could be upheld if the City demonstrated that
nonlabor picketing was "clearly more disruptive than [labor] picketing." Contrary to
the broad dicta in Mosley and elsewhere, our decisions demonstrate that content-
based distinctions, far from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indis-
pensable aspect of a coherent understanding of the First Amendment. '"
Justice Stevens further addressed the issue of conduct-based (as opposed to
context-based) analysis by examining the types of harm that the same conduct or
speech, in different contexts, can produce:
Lighting a fire near an ammunition dump or a gasoline storage tank is especially
dangerous; such behavior may be punished more severely than burning trash in a
vacant lot. Threatening someone because of her race or religious beliefs may cause
particularly severe trauma or touch off a riot, and threatening a high public official
may cause substantial social disruption; such threats may be punished more severely
than threats against someone based on, say, his support of a particular athletic team.
There are legitimate, reasonable, and neutral justifications for such special rules.
4
1
Justice Stevens' arguments center on the idea that many restrictions on speech al-
lowed under the First Amendment are content-based."14 Therefore, it is not the
content of the regulated speech that matters; rather, it is the context. Further, fight-
ing words uttered in a race-based or other biased context may be reasonably deter-
mined by St. Paul to be more dangerous, and consequently more proscribable,
within the boundaries of the First Amendment. 147 Stated another way, in certain
situations, context may justify content-based discrimination.
Further examples of the types of government regulation of speech based on
content are offered in the context of obscenity prohibitions:
Whether, for example, a picture or a sentence is obscene cannot be judged in the ab-
stract, but rather only in the context of its setting, its use, and its audience. Similarly,
although legislatures may freely regulate most nonobscene child pornography, such
pornography that is part of "[A] serious work of art, a documentary on behavioral
problems, or a medical or psychiatric teaching device," may be entitled to constitu-
tional protection; the "question whether a specific act of communication is protected
143. Id. at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 2563 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-
100 (1972)).
145. Id. at 2561.
146. Id. at 2563. See supra notes 38-82 and accompanying text.
147. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2565-66.
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by the First Amendment always requires some consideration of both its content and
its context.
'148
Justice Stevens, therefore, founds his evaluation of the ordinance on a "more com-
plex and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the regulated
speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech."1 49 Had it not been
overly broad, he would have upheld St. Paul's ordinance as an even-handed regu-
lation of speech: "In a battle between advocates of tolerance and advocates of intol-
erance, the ordinance does not prevent either side from hurling fighting words at
the other on the basis of their conflicting ideas, but it does bar both sides from
hurling such words on the basis of. . . 'race, color, creed, religion or gender.' "150
C. Exceptions to the Majority's Rule
Following the rejection of categorical analysis, coupled with the rule that "con-
tent-based regulations are presumptively invalid," 5' the Court created exceptions
to this rule so that the holding in R.A. V would comport more closely with prece-
dent. 52 Justice White summarized these, which he described as "an apparently
nonexhaustive list of ad hoc exceptions," in his concurring opinion. 
15 3
First, "[c]ontent-based distinctions may be drawn within an unprotected cate-
gory of speech if the basis for the distinctions is 'the very reason the entire class of
speech at issue is proscribable.' "154 The next exception was crafted for regulations
which would protect against "secondary effects" of speech ,15 such as the prohibi-
tion against sexually derogatory words which, in a work-place setting, would vio-
late Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;156 along with the "secondary effects"
of adult theaters on the surrounding neighborhood which were sufficient reasons
for the City of Renton to ban the theaters. 5 7 Justice Scalia explained that he saw
these regulations as affecting primarily conduct, and prohibiting speech only inci-
dentally, saying, "[A] particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class
of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at con-
duct rather than speech.""5 8
148. Id. at 2566 (emphasis added) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., con-
curring)).
149. Id. at 2567.
150. Id. at 2571 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
151. Id. at 2542.
152. Id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting id. at 2545). This is the exception which Justice White describes as "swallow[ing] the ...
rule." Id. (White, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 2546 (emphasis omitted).
156. Id. at 2557 (White, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988); 29 C.ER. § 1604.1 l(a)
(1991)).
157. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986), citedin RAy. v. City of St. Paul, 112
S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992). See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
158. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
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The majority's third exception was referred to by Justice White as a "catchall
exclusion to protect against unforeseen problems."" 9 This distinction allows for
regulation of speech where "there is no realistic possibility that official suppres-
sion of ideas is afoot."'160 The majority gave a parenthetical example of the mean-
ing of this exception, saying, "We cannot think of any First Amendment interest
that would stand in the way of a State's prohibiting only those obscene motion pic-
tures with blue-eyed actresses."161
The majority applied its rule of (and exceptions to) content-based discrimina-
tion to the St. Paul ordinance and found the ordinance flawed because it "applies
only to 'fighting words' that insult, or provoke violence, 'on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender.' Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how
vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified
disfavored topics."' 62 To illustrate, if a speaker wished to harangue a member of
her audience on the basis of "political affiliation, union membership, or homosex-
uality," such abusive display would not be prohibited by the St. Paul ordinance.163
This is the reasoning in the majority opinion which the concurrences criticize
harshly as stating a rule of "underbreadth."' 64
D. The Idea of Underbreadth
The majority was concerned that the St. Paul City Council's limitation of the.
ordinance to fighting words based on particular types of expression operated as
"viewpoint discrimination." 6 ' Justice Scalia illustrated this concern with the met-
aphor that St. Paul's ordinance would permit "one side of a debate to fight free-
style, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules."16 6 The
majority further explained that if St. Paul had sought only to prohibit a certain
"mode" of expression, such as threats, then that regulation would fall within an
exception to the First Amendment protections. 167 However, according to the ma-
jority, St. Paul banned a certain "message" - that of racial hostility - of which it
does not approve. 168 "Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the city is
seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas." 69
Justice Scalia and the majority held that an ordinance banning all "fighting
words," not merely those which spring from racial or other biases, would have
159. Id. at 2558 (White, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 2547.
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). Justice Blackmun's brief concurrence concisely
states the "underbreadth" problem: "a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates
speech that does not (setting law and logic on their heads)." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 2547.
166. Id. at 2548.
167. Id. at 2548-49.
168. Id. at 2549.
169. Id.
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accomplished the same effect as the ordinance the Court struck down.17 With
this, the concurring Justices disagreed. Justice White wrote:
[T]he Court's new "underbreadth" creation serves no desirable function. Instead, it
permits, indeed invites, the continuation of expressive conduct that in this case is
evil and worthless in First Amendment terms, until the city of St. Paul cures the un-
derbreadth by adding to its ordinance a catch-all phrase such as "and all other fight-
ing words that may constitutionally be subject to this ordinance."171
Justice White also argued that St. Paul had a compelling state interest in regulating
this type of speech and that the ordinance would work to protect that interest. 
172
E. The Concurring Justices' Overbreadth Analysis
As noted above, the concurring Justices would all have declared the ordinance
unconstitutional for overbreadth. 173 Justice White's concurrence outlined the
overbreadth problem, and all the other concurring Justices joined him for that por-
tion of his opinion. Justice White noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had
relied upon Brandenburg v. Ohio174 and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire175 to con-
strue the statute more narrowly so as to avoid a First Amendment violation.
176
However, the definition of fighting words set out in Chaplinsky was misapplied. 
1 7 7
Chaplinsky defined fighting words as those words "which by their very utter-
ance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."178 The
Minnesota court held that the St. Paul ordinance prohibited those words which
cause "anger, alarm or resentment based on racial, ethnic, gender or religious
bias."179 Justice White stated the rule as follows: "Our fighting words cases have
made clear. . . that such generalized reactions are not sufficient to strip expres-
sion of its constitutional protection. The mere fact that expressive activity causes
hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the expression unpro-
tected."180 Therefore, the ordinance is overbroad because "it also criminalizes a
substantial amount of expression that-however repugnant-is shielded by the
First Amendment."181 Words which merely result in "anger, alarm or resentment"
because they express racial hostility are not constitutionally proscribable, and,
170. Id. at 2550 ("An ordinance not limited to the favored topics ... would have precisely the same beneficial
effect.").
171. Id. at 2553 (citations omitted) (quoting for emphasis only).
172. Id. at 2554 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501 (1991)).
173. See supra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
174. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
175. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
176. R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2559 (1992) (White, J., concurring).
177. Id.
178. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
179. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507,510 (Minn.), cert. grantedsub nora. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991), and rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), quoted in R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J.,
concurring).
180. R.A. V, 112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
181. Id.
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therefore, the statute would need to be redrawn to include specifically words
which "inflict injury" or "incite an immediate breach of the peace," thereby con-
forming to the standard set forth in Chaplinsky. 82
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Policies and Motivations of the Instant Case
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority approvingly quoted the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which had said, "It is the responsibility, even the obligation, of
diverse communities to confront such notions [bigotry, bias, discrimination, prej-
udice, racism, sexism, and other forms of intolerance] in whatever form they ap-
pear."183 The City of St. Paul had argued in its brief to the Supreme Court that the
ordinance at issue was intended to "protect against the victimization of a person or
persons who are particularly vulnerable because of their membership in a group
that historically has been discriminated against."184 St. Paul also argued to the
Court that it had a compelling interest in protecting the "basic human rights" of its
citizens. "I To this Justice Scalia responded, "We do not doubt that these interests
are compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them."'88 Thus,
given these goals, it must have been the means employed, not the anticipated
ends, which drove the Court to invalidate the St. Paul ordinance.
The Court recognized that the harms the City of St. Paul sought to protect
against are real, but said that these types of harms, arising as they do from the op-
eration of speech, are not of the sort that governments may properly proscribe.
187
The constraints of the First Amendment prevent governmental bodies from taking
such action. Were it simply a matter of Robert A. Viktora having accidentally
bashed into the African-American family's car, or murdered their young son, or
sent them letters falsely offering fabulous prizes through the United States mail,
then a host of laws would have redressed the harm suffered by the unnamed fam-
ily. To draw the distinctions more finely, the United States has, of course, ceased
to condone racist acts. No one under color of law can force a person to leave a
lunch counter or to sit at the back of a bus because of that person's race. Yet, racist
speech and the strongly-felt harms it causes continue to be protected. '88 The differ-
ence, certainly, arises because these harms are brought about by speech, or actions
which have sufficient communicative element to be protected as speech. 
189
182. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
183. R.A.V, 464 N.W.2d at 508, quoted in R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2548.
184. Respondents Brief at 28, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (No. 90-7675), quoted in
R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
185. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549.
186. Id.
187. Sd. at 2548-50.
188. See Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. Rav. 979, 980 (1990)
[hereinafter Bollinger].
189. See supra notes 50-54, 72-75 and accompanying text.
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Not only is hate speech protected because it is speech, more than that, such
speech seems to contain a political element. In the loosest sense, Mr. Viktora had a
"political statement" to make when he burned the cross on the family's lawn. Con-
sequently, his actions are protected with all the force of the First Amendment; at
least that has been the reasoning of certain commentators, who have explained the
American courts' grant of constitutional protection to hate speech as based on the
heightened level of protection accorded political speech under current First
Amendment jurisprudence.1 9
Despite Justice Scalia's discussion of abandoning the categorical approach to
First Amendment analysis, it is almost certain that courts and scholars will con-
tinue to makejudgments in categorical terms, although possibly the categories will
take on a somewhat different shape. As they are constructed now, they are based
on content. There are actually two different sorts of categories within which First
Amendment cases are decided: categories of protection (or privilege or "toler-
ance"191), and categories of proscription. The categories of protection range from
political speech, which is the most protected, to commercial speech, which is ac-
corded the least protection.1 92 A comprehensive list of the categories of proscrip-
tion would include "fighting words, clear and present danger, group defamation,
captive audience, intentional infliction of emotional distress, nuisance laws, and
obscenity. "193
One way of approaching the issue of hate speech addressed in the present case is
to consider that a category of protection - political speech - has met head on with
a category of proscription -fighting words. In this confrontation, political speech
won, and a safe bet is that it always will. The way to resolve the confrontation con-
stitutionally may be to rethink the categories themselves. Professor Harel suggests
a resolution through a broader category of "abhorrent speech" which would include
instances of hate speech, as well as pornography,194 which many feminist scholars
have attacked as presenting the same types of harm to women as racist speech and
cross-burnings present to racial minorities.1 95 Harel explains the expected results
of this new categorization as follows:
190. See Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1888 (1992) [hereinafter Harel].
191. "Tolerance" is the term preferred by Lee Bollinger in his 1986 book The Tolerant Society. See Bollinger,
supra note 188, at 983.
192. Harel, supra note 190, at 1892-94.
193. Harel, supra note 190, at 1899-1900 (footnotes omitted). Case references for each of these categories are
listed extensively in the Harel article. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), which lists
"certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem," including "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting." Id. at 571-72.
194. Harel, supra note 190, at 1889.
195. See SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE (1981); Andrea
Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985);
Caryn Jacobs, Patterns of Violence: A Feminist Perspective on the Regulation of Pornography, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 5 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 1 (1985).
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The fragmentation of abhorrent speech into protected and unprotected subcategories
has concealed [a] common nature. Instead of regarding racist and pornographic
speech as peripheral exceptions to the First Amendment, we must view them as in-
stances of a comprehensive category of unprotected speech. From this perspective,
the relations between abhorrent speech and privileged forms of speech must be ex-
amined. Abhorrent speech has been protected because of its alleged contribution to
political discourse. However, a close examination of the nature of political discourse
reveals that this classification is flawed. Abhorrent speech cannot contribute to po-
litical discourse because it promotes values that cannot generate genuine political
obligations.19
If one accepts that traditional protections of racist speech stem from its mis-
categorization as political speech, then whatever the apparent political nature of
such speech (Mr. Viktora was, after all, a neo-Nazi), it has no value as political
discourse because "racist speech cannot change or influence our political obliga-
tions."197 Hate speech simply lacks the minimal normative social force and ability
to bind us as a society which ought to be the requirements for protection as politi-
cal speech.1 98
Harel explicitly applied his theory of abhorrent speech to the traditional fight-
ing words doctrine, which he said "illustrates the bias inherent in traditional judi-
cial exceptions to First Amendment protection. This doctrine protects the interests
of those who fight back, neglecting to protect those who are less likely to react vio-
lently on account of their different cultural or psychological background." 99 Sim-
ply put, some other theory of valuation of political discourse would result in a
more sensible ordering of the broad protections afforded under the political
speech category of First Amendment jurisprudence.
Other motivations and revelations about the state-of-mind of the Court in this
decision are found in Justice Blackmun's brief concurrence: "I fear that the Court
has been distracted from its proper mission by the temptation to decide the issue
over 'politically correct speech' and 'cultural diversity,' neither of which is pre-
sented here. If this is the meaning of today's opinion, it is perhaps even more re-
grettable."20 As lawyers, scholars, and the population at large become more
aware of the ways our Supreme Court truly is affected by extra-legal debate, it be-
comes less difficult to imagine that this decision, and the new rule of First
Amendment law it sets forth, has its genesis in a squabble taking place largely on
college and university campuses.
There has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of the ways educational in-
stitutions can confront the growing problem of acts of racial, gender-based, or
196. Harel, supra note 190, at 1930.
197. Harel, supra note 190, at 1922.
198. Harel, supra note 190, at 1922.
199. Harel, supra note 190, at 1902.
200. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2561 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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other biased motivation.2"1 The issue of regulation of speech in a university atmo-
sphere is not specifically under consideration here; it is only broached in order to
show that the Court may have been willing to base its decision on a cultural de-
bate, rather than attempting to decide the issue within the existing legal frame-
work.
The recognition of this problem provided the background for Anthony
D'Amato's article, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy.22 In it he
wrote, "[T]he constitutional law of at least one category of content regulation of
free speech ["harmful speech"] is indeterminate, and recognition of this indeter-
minacy has been and ought to continue to be the Supreme Court's decisional basis
for protecting speech against content regulation."" 3 D'Amato defines "harmful
speech" as speech acts at issue in those "cases in which the factfinder and/or deci-
sionmaker must arrive at a judgment. . . that harm must have occurred because
the particular utterance in question is itself harm producing. "204 The reason that
the law in this area of harmful speech is indeterminate is because the underlying
culture is indeterminate; "[t]he strong currents of our culture propel the constitu-
tional law of free speech. 205 In one social context, "damned racketeer" and
"damned Fascist" are fighting words, while in another era "Fuck you pigs" are
not. 
206
Given this indeterminacy, Professor D'Amato arrives at the conclusion that
laws restricting "harmful speech" should not be allowed under the Constitution.0 7
Because language is slippery, because what is "harmful" or "offensive" or "pro-
scribable" is ever-changing within our culture (D'Amato cites as proof the sexual
mores of the early days in motion pictures and television programming as com-
pared to that which is seen today),208 courts cannot properly fashion decisions
about which sorts of speech fall within the category of "harmful." Rather,
201. See Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are First Amendment Values Func-
tionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (199 1); J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults
and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399 (1991); Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Thomas Huff, Addressing Hate Messages at
the University of Montana: Regulating and Educating, 53 MONT. L. REv. 157 (1992); Robert A. Sedler, The Un-
constitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech": The View from Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 631
(1992); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484
(1990); Ellen E. Lange, Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (1990); David F McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, Comment, A Libertarian Critique of Uni-
versity Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825 (1991); David Rosenberg, Note, Racist Speech, the
First Amendment, and Public Universities: Taking a Stand on Neutrality, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (1991); Sean
M. SeLegue, Comment, Campus Anti-Slur Regulations: Speakers, Victims, and the First Amendment, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 919 (1991).
202. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329
(1991).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 330 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
205. Id. at 332.
206. See supra note 13.
207. D'Amato, supra note 202, at 330.
208. Id. at 344-45.
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D'Amato argues, "The claimant should prove harm independently from the utter-
ance if we are to give free speech breathing room."209
The Court in R.A. V was willing to accept that harm had been done, holding
instead that there was no governmental remedy for this type of harm. 21° This
"easy" way out, based as it seems to have been on vague fears of campus "thought
police" infringing on the rights of racists to spout hate, leads us nowhere in the an-
alytical development of this area of the law. The Court applied its old categorical
system, while claiming to explicitly reject it, and identified a particularized wrong,
while providing no means for redress.211
B. The Future of Anti-Hate Speech Laws
The reasons the City of St. Paul enacted the ordinance are not hard to see. The
goal was to encourage one type of speech by criminalizing another type. There
was certainly a value judgment made, resulting in a legally-enforced suppression
of speech. The city government decided that St. Paul would be a better place, a
safer, happier, more well-balanced community, if the people of St. Paul were pro-
hibited by law from attacking one another for reasons based on race, religion, or
gender.212 The effect of the ordinance was aimed, not so much at punishing behav-
ior, as at fostering a more tolerant social consciousness among the citizenry.213
Stated differently, "[Anti-hate speech] rules are plainly not designed to regulate
specific forms of behavior or expression, but rather to encompass and to forbid all
exterior 'signs' of an interior frame of mind."214 Thus, by forbidding any physical
manifestation or expression of this "frame of mind," we reduce its occurrence.
This legislation by the St. Paul City Council is a good example of an attempt to
deal with the tensions between democracy, in which each expression of idea is val-
ued equally, and community, in which some ideas must be suppressed, or given
less value, for the good of all. 21 5 As another writer has put it, "The plain fact is that
not all free speech is good speech. Which means that freedom of speech is not al-
ways a sound or just public policy."2 6 Some thinkers have argued for an "accom-
modationist" approach which would "endorse tightly worded, cautiously
progressive measures that tend to proscribe only targeted vilification of a person
on the basis of race, gender, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, or other
209. Id. at 351.
210. R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992). "Let there be no mistake about our belief that
burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to pre-
vent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire." Id.
211. It must be noted that Justice Scalia commented in a footnote that there were other Minnesota statutes un-
der which the petitioner could have been charged, including those for "terroristic threats," arson, and criminal
damage to property. Id. at 2541 n. 1. While "terroristic threats" comes closer to the mark, it seems clear that fire
damage to the lawn was not the real harm done.
212. Id. at 2569-71 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267, 269
(1991) [hereinafter Post].
215. See id. at 286-87.
216. WALTER BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE& THE FIRST AMENDMENT 125 (1957).
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protected characteristics."217 This, it seems, is precisely the route the City of St.
Paul took, and it was unsuccessful. So, short of the sweeping changes in First
Amendment analysis discussed above, entailing rejection of the protection of hate
speech as a form of political speech and creating a new, proscribable category of
"abhorrent speech,"218 what options does the Court have for dealing with a bur-
geoning legal and social problem?
One possibility for resolving the hate speech conflict between protection for
political speech and censure for "fighting words" involves a look toward the
Court's solution in another case where two categories clashed. In New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,219 the problem was a conflict between the protections traditionally
accorded citizens to criticize their political leaders and the laws against defama-
tion.220 Justice Brennan described the "profound national commitment to the prin-
ciple that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks."221 The Court sensibly crafted a heightened standard for alleging defama-
tion when the plaintiff in the defamation action is a public figure-that plaintiff
must allege and prove actual malice.222
Similarly, when a speech act is alleged to constitute "hate speech," then the pro-
tections for political speech could be suspended unless or until it is proven that the
speech does have real political value, meaning as Professor Harel suggests, that it
adds to our national debate, that it is in fact "part of political discourse." '223 This
proposal is analogous to the holding of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, but in some
ways is contrary. The focus should be on the values the courts seek to protect. In
Sullivan, the proper focus was on the right of citizens to criticize public officials;
in the hate speech context, the concern would be the right to be free from racial or
other improperly-biased attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
With social, racial, and ideological gulfs ever widening-with affirmative
action and entitlement programs continuing to cause divisiveness -these "political
correctness" issues will continue to be debated, and "anti-hate speech" laws will
continue to be enacted by governments at all levels. 224 The question of their effec-
tiveness is in many ways the same as the larger question of the deterrent effect of
217. Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 211,213 (1991).
218. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
219. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
220. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
221. Id. at 270.
222. Id. at 279-80.
223. Harel, supra note 190, at 1889.
224. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Defining the Freedom to Hate While Punching, N.Y. TlMrS, Dec. 20, 1992,
at 4-5 [hereinafter Greenhouse]. "Hate-crime laws have spread quickly with little guidance from the
courts .... While Justice Antonin Scalia's analysis in the St. Paul case last June. . .was sweeping, .. it is not
clear that the Court will apply that analysis automatically to resolve [other] case[s]." Id.
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any type of criminal sanction, and honest minds differ widely on that issue.22 But
with this type of law, symbolic value may be seen as having as much worth as any
ability to pursue additional criminal charges. Communities want to be able to say
to their citizens, and to the rest of the nation: "We will not tolerate racial epithets
or threats being cast in our community. We want all races, religions, and ethnici-
ties to feel welcome here. In order to accomplish this, we are willing to proscribe
the expression of certain points of view in order to nurture others."
Therein lies the real irony behind this type of legislation - widely perceived as a
dilemma for liberals226- that groups and individuals who would ordinarily defend
freedom of speech are feeling themselves drawn toward law-making that would
suppress that freedom.227 Professor Post expressed the conflicting impulses well,
saying, "I should add that writing this essay has been difficult and painful. I am
committed both to principles of freedom of expression and to the fight against rac-
ism. The topic under consideration has forced me to set one aspiration against the
other, which I can do only with reluctance and a heavy heart."228 As a final word
on the apologist tone which imbues so much of the writing in favor of restricting
hate speech,"' it may well be that we can restrict hate speech on constitutionally
sound grounds, without necessitating a sort of "guilty conscience" because of mis-
placed feelings that we are meeting one group's intolerance and hate with intoler-
ance of our own.
225. The Court ruled on June 11, 1993, in a Wisconsin case arising from a penalty enhancement feature of
Wisconsin law that would increase criminal penalties for crimes found to have been motivated by racial, ethnic,
or religious hatred. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). Various groups such as the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith and the American Civil Liberties Union had supported the penalty-enhancement approach
to anti-bias legislation, and the Supreme Court upheld this tactic as constitutional. Id. at 2196, 2201.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell is distinguishable from the R.A. V case because through the penalty enhancement mecha-
nism, it is clearly conduct, with no protected speech element at all, which is being punished. See id. at 2199.
Criminal courts are thoroughly familiar with inquiries into the alleged criminal intent and motivation, so it is not
a constitutional error to punish law-breakers more severely "if the victim is selected because of his race or other
protected status." Id.
An apparent change in tone from R.A. V should be noted in this case. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
unanimous opinion of the Court and stated:
[T]he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this conduct is
thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the State and its amici,
bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on
their victims, and incite community unrest.
Id. at 2201. This argument worked for the State of Wisconsin in the penalty-enhancement context, but it was
ineffective for the City of St. Paul in the "pure speech" realm one term earlier.
226. See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, Scalia Outdoes theACLU, WASH. POST, June 30, 1992, at A- 19 ("The free speech
world had been turned upside down.").
227. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 224, at 4-5. "But does the First Amendment really disable the Govern-
ment from responding to the political need to tell the world that violence driven by racial hatred is more destruc-
tive than violence driven by class hatred, political animosity, labor strife or just plain greed?" Id.
228. Post, supra note 214, at 271.
229. Professor Harel also recognizes and analyzes this scholarly-angst phenomenon. See Harel, supra note
190, at 1911.
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